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Whatever Happened to the Baby Bells?
Internationalization and De-internationalization in
the Telecommunications Industry
Jason Whalley ∗ & Peter Curwen ∗∗
INTRODUCTION
Just after the turn of the millennium, the
telecommunications industry made two assessments of the
internationalization of the United States-based Baby Bells. 1
Chan-Olmstead and Jamison suggested that the Baby Bells had
developed significant international footprints on the basis of
which the Baby Bells could become global operators. 2 In
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1. The Baby Bells are also known as regional Bell operating companies
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2. Sylvia Chan-Olmsted & Mark Jamison, Rivalry Through Alliances:
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contrast, Ratner stated that “the Yanks are going” and argued
that a lack of buyers could prolong their exit from Europe. 3
Although Chan-Olmstead and Jamison 4 reinforced earlier
comments made by the likes of Hausman 5 , Kupfer, 6 and
Watson 7 it was Ratner’s prediction 8 that turned out to be the
more accurate of the two. However, Ratner 9 herself
underestimated the scale of de-internationalization that the
Baby Bells would undergo. By 2006, the Baby Bells had
retreated not only from Europe but also from Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. The Baby Bells have sold virtually all of their
international operations to once again focus solely on the
United States market.
This paper provides an overview of the internationalization
of the Baby Bells and analyzes why they have so
enthusiastically embraced de-internationalization. With this in
mind, the rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part I
focuses on the Baby Bells, briefly describing the regulatory
environment which led to their inception and development as
major
players
in
the
domestic
and
international
telecommunications markets.
Part II describes the
methodology used to measure the international investments of
the Baby Bells and analyzes the growth and decline of their
overseas presence. Part III posits that the Baby Bells have so
dramatically changed their international strategies due to
lagging financial returns, a changing regulatory environment,
and the effect of various mergers and acquisitions within the
industry.

Competitive Strategy in the Global Telecommunications Market, 19 EUR.
MGMT. J., 317, 328 (2001).
3. Juliana Ratner & Richard Waters, Baby Bells Look for a Way to Go
Home from European Trip, FIN. TIMES, May 26, 2001, at 16.
4. Chan-Olmsted & Jamison, supra note 2.
5. Jerry A. Hausman, The Bell Operating Companies and AT&T Venture
Abroad While British Telecom and Others Come to the United States, in
GLOBALIZATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND COMPETITION:
THE FUSION OF
COMPUTERS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN THE 1990S, 313 (Stephen P.
Bradley, Jerry A. Hausman, & Richard L. Nolan eds., 1993).
6. Andrew Kupfer, Ma Bell and Seven Babies Go Global, FORTUNE, Nov.
4, 1991 at 118.
7. Sharon Watson, US Carriers Go Overseas in Search of Telecom’s “Holy
Grail”, TELEPHONY, Dec. 20 1993, at 18.
8. Ratner & Waters, supra note 3.
9. Id.
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I. THE BABY BELLS
In early 1982, the chairman of AT&T announced that it had
settled its long-running dispute with the Department of
Justice. 10 This settlement, which technically altered AT&T’s
1956 Consent Decree with the consequence that it was called
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), required AT&T to divest
its interests in twenty-two Bell Operating Companies (BOCs)
that provided local telephone services. 11 In return, AT&T was
freed from its 1956 Consent Decree obligations, thereby
enabling it to enter new markets such as information services or
those outside of regulated telecommunications. 12 The MFJ
came into force at the start of 1984. .
The MFJ required the management of AT&T to develop
detailed plans to implement the divestiture of its BOCs. These
plans created seven Baby Bells holding companies, Bell
Communications Research (Bellcore) to provide research
services to the Baby Bells, 13 and transferred the directory
publishing operations of AT&T to individual Baby Bells. 14
Thus, upon divestiture, each of the Baby Bells was composed of
at least one BOC, the directory publishing operations of AT&T
within its region, and a one-seventh stake in Bell
10. For details of this dispute, which at its heart was centered on the
uncooperative relationship between AT&T and new entrants such as MCI, see
Richard H.K. Vietor, AT&T and the Public Good: Regulation and Competition
in
Telecommunications,
1910-1987,
in
FUTURE COMPETITION IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 27 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds.,
1989); PETER TEMIN, THE FALL OF THE BELL SYSTEM (1987); Marcellus S.
Snow, The AT&T Divestiture:
A 10-Year Retrospective, in, BEYOND
COMPETITION: THE FUTURE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 207 (Douglas M.
Lamberton ed.,1995).
11. See Snow, supra note 10, at 211-212. The MJF also required that
AT&T sell its stakes in two other, non-Bell, local telecommunication
companies, Cincinnati & Suburban and Southern New England Telephone. Id.
12. See id. at 212.
13. Ownership of Bellcore was divided equally among the seven Baby
Bells. MICHAEL CARPENTIER ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION 25
(1992). A second role of Bellcore was to “serve as a coordination center for
communication services with regard to national security interests and
emergency services activities.” Id. at 26.
14. Given that the overarching rationale of divestiture was to separate
monopoly from competitive activities, it was thought that the directory
publishing activities would remain with AT&T. However, as directory
publishing revenues has been treated as BOC revenues for almost a decade
prior to 1984, they were transferred to the Baby Bells where their revenues
would help to reduce local charges. DAVID CHESSLER ET AL., NAT’L REG. RES.
INST., UNREGULATED ENTERPRISES OF THE BELL REGIONAL HOLDING
COMPANIES (1986).
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In contrast, the new-AT&T
Communications Research. 15
offered long-distance, manufacturing and research services
organized in accordance with the Computer 2 enquiry. 16
Although this division of AT&T’s businesses resulted in a
significantly smaller company, the new AT&T still had assets of
$35 billion. 17 In addition, each of the seven Baby Bells was a
substantial enterprise in its own right. As shown in Table 1, the
seven Baby Bells held assets ranging from $14.4 billion to $19.7
billion with revenues varying from $7.8 billion to $10.5 billion. 18
Covering fourteen states, US West was geographically the
largest of the Baby Bells, while Pacific Telesis had the fewest
number of states – two – within its territory. The remaining
Baby Bells covered between five and eight states.
TABLE 1: THE BABY BELLS, JANUARY 1984 19
Baby Bell
Ameritech

Revenues

Profits

Assets

$bn

$mn

$bn

9.0

1100

15.4

Employees

No of

79,000

6

states

Bell Atlantic

9.1

1100

15.4

80,000

7

BellSouth

10.5

1500

19.7

99,100

8

Nynex

10.4

1100

16.2

98,200

6

Pacific Telesis

8.5

970

15.3

82,000

2

Southwestern

8.0

1000

14.8

74,700

5

7.8

950

14.4

75,000

14

Bell
US West

15. See CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25-26.
16. In 1997 the Federal Communications Commission launched an
investigation, Computer 2 enquiry, to separate data communications services
from data processing services. WINDOWS ON A NEW WORLD: THE THIRD
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 162 (Joseph Finklestein ed., Greenwood Press 1989).
The Computer 2 enquiry required that basic services be separated from
advanced services. As a result, AT&T on divestiture was comprised of two
principal subsidiaries, AT&T Communications, responsible for long distance
telecommunications within the United States, and AT&T Technologies. This
latter company brought together Bell Laboratories with other companies such
as AT&T International and AT&T Information Systems subsidiaries. See
CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 28; see also Vietor, supra note 10, at 83
for a full list of the businesses operated by AT&T Technologies.
17. Vietor, supra note 10, at 84.
18. CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 22-23; Vietor, supra note 10, at
82. See generally Brian O’Reilly, Ma Bell’s Kids Fight for Position, FORTUNE,
June 27, 1983, at 62-69.
19. CARPENTIER ET AL., supra note 13, at 22-23; Vietor, supra note 10, at
82. O’Reilly, supra note 18.
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As it was widely believed that the Baby Bells would act in
an anti-competitive manner like their former parent company, 20
significant restrictions were placed on them. 21 The MFJ
prohibited
them
from
providing
inter-exchange
telecommunication
services
or
information
services,
manufacturing or providing telecommunications products or
customer premises equipment, and providing any other product
or service, except exchange telecommunications and exchange
access service that is not a natural monopoly service actually
regulated by tariff. 22
The Baby Bells could, however, apply for waivers that
would allow them to enter new lines of business if they could
demonstrate that they would not exercise monopoly power in
these markets. 23 Unsurprisingly, the Baby Bells sought to limit
these restrictions, by requesting waivers to enter a wide variety
of new markets. 24 By dint of numerous waiver applications, the
Baby Bells were able to remove some of the lines of business
restrictions. 25 It was, however, only with the passing of the
Telecommunications Act 26 in February 1996 that their entry
into the inter-exchange and equipment manufacturing markets
became a possibility.

20. David Sappington, Revisiting the Line-of-Business Restrictions, 16
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 291, 291-293 (1995); Kevin R. Sullivan,
Competition in Telecommunications: Moving Toward a New Era of Antitrust
Scrutiny and Regulation, in FUTURE COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
124-125 (Stephen P. Bradley & Jerry A. Hausman eds. 1989).
21. Vietor, supra note 10, at 84.
22. Id.
23. Snow, supra note 10, at 212.
24. See Sappington, supra note 20 at 125.
25. Paul H. Rubin & Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Costs of Delay and RentSeeking Under the Modification of Final Judgment, in DEREGULATING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THE BABY BELLS CASE FOR COMPETITION 107-11
(Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin eds. 1995).
26. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), reprinted in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614
[hereinafter Telecommunications Act].
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TABLE 2: LINE OF BUSINESS RESTRICTIONS AND RELEASE
DATES 27
Line of business restriction

Release date

Other non-regulated services

September 1987

Information services

July 1991

Inter-exchange telecommunication services

February 1996

Manufacturing products and CPE

February 1996

The 1996 Act also stated that the Baby Bells were free to
enter the long-distance market once they had satisfied a
fourteen-point competitive checklist. 28 After an initial hiatus,
when none of the Baby Bells were able to persuade regulators
that their local markets were sufficiently competitive (one of the
requirements of the fourteen-point checklist), the first longdistance application was granted in December 1999 in New
York. Since then, all of the Baby Bells have been granted
permission to provide long-distance services. 29
As the regulatory framework changed, so too did the Baby
Bells. Since their inception in 1984, the Baby Bells have
expanded and diversified their markets and offerings as well as
restructured their organizations. All of the Baby Bells expanded
from the regional markets that they had inherited at divestiture
into other parts of the United States, although some did so more
vigorously than others. 30 US West, for example, expanded into
dispersed parts of the United States through the purchase of
cellular and cable-television franchises. 31 In contrast,
Ameritech was more reserved in its expansion, preferring to
focus on markets geographically contiguous to its five-state
Great Lakes region, such as St Louis, Missouri, rather than on

27. Jason L. Whalley, Foreign Direct Investment in Emerging Industries
in Conditions of Market Imperfections: Telecommunications and the Case of
the Regional Bell Operating Companies, 1984 – 1996 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Strathclyde) (on file with author).
28. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26.
29. Peter Curwen, For Whom the Bells Toll, 5 INFO 81, 81-82 (2003).
30. Whalley, supra note 27.
31. Tomo Noda & Joseph L. Bower, Strategy Making as Iterated Processes
of Resource Allocation, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 159 (1996).
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other parts of the United States. 32
The Baby Bells also engaged in diversification. In the
immediate aftermath of divestiture, the Baby Bells entered a
wide range of new lines of business, and while some of these
were related to their core telecommunications operations, others
were not. 33 US West acquired a substantial property portfolio
within its region while Nynex entered both the software and
computer retailing markets. Bell Atlantic entered the computer
industry, though most of its diversification appears to have
focused on the leasing and financing markets. The expansion of
the Baby Bells into non-telecommunications markets continued
until the early 1990s, when regulatory changes and the
continued disappointing financial results of many of the
diversified investments resulted in reversal. As a consequence,
by the late 1990s the Baby Bells had largely exited these
businesses.
The Baby Bells also restructured themselves. The various
restructurings that have occurred are shown in Figure 1, which
highlights the complexity of a consolidation process that by
early 2006, reduced the number of Baby Bells to three, namely
Qwest (US West), Verizon Communications (Bell Atlantic,
Nynex), and AT&T (Ameritech, BellSouth, Pacific Telesis,
Southwestern Bell). The consolidation process that resulted in
these three Baby Bells is explained below, with each of the
three being addressed in turn.
FIGURE 1: BABY BELL RESTRUCTURING, 1984-2006
MediaOne
divested
Acquired
by Qwest
Intl

Tracking
stock
created

US West
Bell Atlantic
Nynex

Qwest
Acquires
MCI

Acquires GTE,
becomes
Verizon

Verizon

Becomes
SBC

Southwestern
Bell

Acquires AT&T, changes
name to AT&T

AirTouch
divested

Pacific Telesis
Ameritech

Forms
Cingular

Acquires
AT&TW

2000

2004

BellSouth
1984

1988

1992

1996

Year

32. Whalley, supra note 27.
33. Whalley, supra note 27. The Baby Bells entered into a wide variety of
new markets including, real estate, computer retailing, financial services,
software development and liquefied petroleum gas distribution. Id.
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After expanding outside of its region through both
acquisitions and joint ventures, US West grouped all of its nonBOC operations together in 1995 into a new holding company
called US West Media Group. Tracking shares in this new
holding company were then issued pro-rata to all existing US
West shareholders. 34 In addition, US West sold its domestic
cellular operations to AirTouch Communications in April 1998
for $5.9 billion which eventually became part ofAT&T
Verizon
Wireless, a joint venture between Verizon Communications and
Vodafone.
In 1997, the board of US West sought to formalize the
separation of its BOC and non-BOC operations via a proposal to
separate US West Media from US West. Prior to the actual
separation, regulatory requirements necessitated the transfer of
the fourteen-state directory publishing operations from US
West Media to US West for $4.75 billion in debt and stock. The
domestic cable-television businesses, as well as all of the
international operations of US West, were spun off as
MediaOne in June 1998.
AT&T subsequently acquired
MediaOne in April 1999 for $58 billion as part of its drive to
become a key player in the U.S. broadband market. 35
The spin-off of MediaOne meant that US West was almost
the same as it was at divestiture in 1984; that is, a company
providing local telephone and directory publishing services
within its region. The revenue and earnings stability associated
with both businesses made US West an attractive takeover
target, especially to companies in search of revenues to fund
expansion in other markets. After a short bidding war between
two long distance operators, Global Crossing and Qwest
International, US West succumbed to a $51.3 billion takeover
from Qwest International in June 1999. US West subsequently
changed its name to Qwest.
34. US WEST COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, 1995 FINANCIALS (1996). By
issuing tracking shares, US West was able to create a stock that followed that
performance of its non-BOC operations without separating ownership of these
operations from the Baby Bell. If any dividends were paid, these would be
funded by the non-BOC operations.
35. See PETER CURWEN & JASON WHALLEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
STRATEGY – CASES, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 78-99 (2004). The focus of
AT&T at the time on the United States broadband market contributed to its
decision to sell most of the international operations of MediaOne, a process
that also helped AT&T recoup a substantial proportion of the cost. Id.
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Bell Atlantic and Nynex are two Baby Bells whose fortunes
became interwoven. Less than two months after the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 36 became law, Bell Atlantic
entered into a $25.6 billion “merger of equals” with Nynex. 37
This consolidated its position in the northeast of the United
States, and increased its stake to 50% in PCS PrimeCo, a
cellular joint venture that eventually became part of Verizon
Wireless. In July 1998, Bell Atlantic merged with GTE in a deal
valued at $67 billion, and on completion of the merger changed
its name to Verizon Communications. Finally, after a short
bidding war with Qwest, Verizon Communications acquired
MCI in early 2005 for $10.8 billion.
Through a variety of maneuvers, the remaining four Baby
Bells consolidated to become AT&T. In late 1993, Pacific Telesis
grouped together its non-regulated subsidiaries in PacTel
Corporation and sold 14% of its stock to outside shareholders.
Just a few months later, in April 1994, Pacific Telesis
distributed its remaining stake in PacTel Corporation on a prorata basis to its existing shareholders. On completion of the
spin-off, PacTel Corporation changed its name to AirTouch
Communications. .
In
April
1996,
SBC
Communications,
formerly
Southwestern Bell, 38 entered into a $16.5 billion “merger of
equals” with Pacific Telesis.
During 1998, SBC
Communications merged with two more telecommunication
companies. In January 1998 it merged with SNET though given
their relative sizes this was effectively an acquisition, 39 in May
it merged with Ameritech in a deal worth $68 billion. 40

36. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26.
37. BELL ATLANTIC CORP., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1999). In the “merger of
equals” between Nynex and Bell Atlantic, Nynex became a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Bell Atlantic and its shareholders received stock in Bell Atlantic.
This qualified the merger as a tax-free reorganization, which meant that all
financial accounts prior to the merger had to be restated as if they had been a
single company all along. Id.
38. Southwestern Bell changed its name to SBC Communications in 1994,
in part to downplay its geographical heritage.
39. Press Release, Southern New England to Merge with SBC
Communications (Jan. 5, 1998), available at http://www.att.com/gen/pressroom?pid=4800&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=6492.
The disparity in size
between SNET and SBC is illustrated by the distribution of shares in the
merged company. Although the deal valued SNET at $4.4 billion, its
shareholders would hold 6% of the resulting company’s shares while SBC
shareholders would hold the remaining 94%. Id.
40. SBC COMMUNICATIONS INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1998 26 (1999).
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In 2000, SBC Communications and BellSouth merged their
domestic cellular operations to form Cingular Wireless, a 60-40
joint venture. 41 In October 2004, Cingular Wireless paid $41
billion to acquire AT&T Wireless, one of the companies that
emerged from the restructuring of AT&T just after the turn of
the millennium. 42 . This restructuring effectively saw AT&T
divest its wireless and broadband operations and close its
residential long-distance business to new customers in order to
focus on the corporate long-distance market.
At the start of 2005, SBC Communications announced its
intention to merge with AT&T in a deal valued at $16 billion.
When the merger was approved in November 2005, SBC
Communications changed its name to AT&T. In March 2006
AT&T announced that it would merge with BellSouth in a deal
valued at $84 billion. Although both sets of shareholders have
approved the merger, final approval is not expected until the
latter part of 2006. Assuming that regulatory approval is
forthcoming as anticipated, this merger will, as shown in Figure
1, reduce the number of independent Baby Bells to three:
Qwest, Verizon Communications, and AT&T.
II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DEINTERNATIONALIZATION OFTHE BABY BELLS
During the period that the Baby Bells underwent
restructuring, their international ambitions and footprints also
evolved. This is the focus of the remainder of the paper. The
frequent name changes of the Baby Bells may cause confusion.
To avoid this, the following convention is adopted in the rest of
this paper: SBC is used throughout the period from 1984 to
2006, while Bell Atlantic and Nynex are used in conjunction
with events occurring between 1984 and 1996. Between 1996
and 1998 Bell Atlantic/Nynex is used, whereas after 1998
Verizon is adopted.

41. Press Release, BellSouth, SBC Create Nation’s 2nd Largest Wireless
Company with $10.2 Billion in Revenues (Apr. 5, 2000), available at
http://bellsouth.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=2688.
42. Press Release, Cingular Wireless, Cingular to Acquire AT&T Wireless,
Create Nation’s Premier Carrier (Feb. 17, 2004), available at
http://cingular.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=press_releases&item=520.
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A. METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING INTERNATIONALIZATION
There is no consensus as to how internationalization should
be measured. Dörrenbächer and Sullivan both suggest three
broad categories of possible measurement indicators: structural,
performance, and attitudinal. 43 According to Dörrenbächer,
structural indicators are those that provide a picture of the
international entanglement of a company at a given moment in
time. Examples include the number of countries in which the
company is present, as well as foreign assets as a percentage of
total assets. 44 In contrast, performance indicators measure how
well the company is performing abroad. Two such indicators
are, according to Dörrenbächer, turnover and operating profit. 45
Sullivan suggests three possible measures: research and
development intensity, advertising intensity, and export sales
as a percentage of total sales. 46 Attitudinal measures focus on
the relationship between the home country of the
internationalizing company and its operations abroad. One
possible measure is the amount of international experience
senior management possess while another is the psychic
dispersion of the international operations. 47
Although a wide range of possible measures of
internationalization have been suggested, some are easier to
implement than others. In particular, the availability of data
influences which measures are feasible and which are not.
Moreover, the Baby Bells do not by any means describe their
international operations in detail. As a consequence, it is hard
to determine the exact size of their international operations in
terms of capital invested, revenue, or subscribers. In addition,
the data can also be inconsistent between years, not least
because the Baby Bells regularly restate their accounts to
reflect acquisitions and divestments as well as changing
regulatory requirements. This is particularly problematic when
restatements are made that affect several years, requiring a
decision as to whether each year should be treated separately as
reported at the time or whether the most recent sequence of

43. See Cristoph Dörrenbächer, Measuring Corporate Internationalisation:
A Review of Measurement Concepts and Their Use, 35 INTERECONOMICS 119
(2000); Daniel Sullivan, Measuring the Degree of Internationalization of a
Firm, 25 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUDIES 325 (1994).
44. Dörrenbächer, supra note 43, at 120.
45. Id.
46. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 331.
47. Id. at 332.
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data from the company should be used.
The international operations of the Baby Bells are also
obscured by their consolidations with other businesses. Since
1984, these international operations have been consolidated
with their diversified holdings, directory-publishing operations
or with all non-regulated activities. 48 The inconsistency that
occurs, both between years and between Baby Bells, complicates
any attempt to undertake a longitudinal analysis of their
internationalization. This inconsistency also means that a
longitudinal financial analysis of internationalization in a
manner similar to Daßler et al 49 or Gerpott and Jakopin 50 is not
possible for the Baby Bells.
While financial data are not provided for all international
operations, it is possible to calculate the balance between
regulated and non-regulated Baby Bell revenues. However, nonregulated revenues can, depending on the Baby Bell, contain
revenues from non-telecommunication activities such as
property management or computer retailing, as well as
directory publishing, domestic cellular, and international
revenues. 51 Moreover, not only has the balance between
regulated and non-regulated revenues changed over time but
the portfolio of activities contributing to the non-regulated
activities has also changed. 52 If the proportion of non-regulated
revenue increases over time, this may be due to revenue growth
in one of several revenue sources or a decline in regulated

48. CHESSLER ET AL., supra note 14. The authors were surprised at the
complex organizational structures that the Baby Bells adopted in the
aftermath of divestiture given their previous arguments against structural
separation. Id. at 54-59. The structures adopted effectively divided the Baby
Bells into two; that is into the Bell Operating Companies and support services
on the one hand and everything else on the other. The international
investments of the Baby Bells would be included in this “everything else”
category.
49. Thoralf Daßler et al., Economic Performance in European
Telecommunications, 1978-1998: A Comparative Study, 14 EUR. BUS. REV.
194 (2002).
50. Torsten J. Gerpott & Nejc M. Jakopin, The Degree of
Internationalization and the Financial Performance of European Mobile
Network Operators, 29 TELECOMM. POL’Y 635 (2005).
51. See EDWIN ROSENBERG ET AL., NAT’L REG. RES. INST., REGIONAL
TELEPHONE HOLDING COMPANIES: STRUCTURES, AFFILIATE TRANSACTIONS,
AND REGULATORY OPTIONS 93-105 (1993) for a discussion of the relationship
between regulation and revenues.
52. See Whalley, supra note 27.
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revenues. In other words, non-regulated revenue is too broad a
category to shed light on the Baby Bells’ international
investment revenue trends.
Due to the limited availability of data and the inherent
inconsistency of much of what is available, the approach
adopted here is to take data from the annual reports without
considering any restatements that may subsequently occur. In
other words, only data for the year just finished are taken from
each annual report. All international investments that appear
in annual reports are considered, and when constructing the
international presence of each of the Baby Bells they are
treated the same. In other words, no account is taken of the
different scale of the international investments.
Although it is acknowledged that this means that two
international investments with, for instance, vastly different
revenues will be treated as identical when in reality they are
not, such a stance has been adopted because data are
incomplete. Quite simply, the annual reports of the Baby Bells
do not provide sufficiently detailed data between 1984 and 2006
to determine the size of every international investment they
made. Thus, while determinants of size such as subscribers,
revenues and capital invested will be used where appropriate,
no systematic attempt is made to compare the size of all of the
Baby Bells’ international investments.
Multiple investments in the same country are counted
separately, primarily so that the number of separate
investments made outside the United States for each Baby Bell
can be ascertained. A second reason is that, on occasion, the
Baby Bells have invested in several different lines of business
within the same country. For example, US West invested in
three different lines of business in the United Kingdom (UK). 53
In total, eight different lines of business are identified, namely:
cable, cellular, content, data, equipment, fixed (which includes
public telephone operators, second national operators, facilities
management, long-distance, and international cable), paging
and services (which includes directory and information services,
software, alarms, and security services). However, when the
number of countries is determined, multiple businesses in the
same location are discounted.
Wherever possible the equity stake held by a Baby Bell in
its international investment has been identified. For all but

53. US WEST, UNLOCKING THE VALUE: INVESTOR’S HANDBOOK 38ff (1994).
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sixteen investments, it has been possible to identify the equity
stake held. Equity stakes are integral to calculating the
proportionate subscribers of cellular investments. However, this
is far from straightforward since not only is the number of
subscribers often hard to ascertain but the equity stakes held by
the Baby Bells also change between years and are
inconsistently documented. Particular attention was paid to
identifying holding companies so that the problems identified by
Curwen 54 were avoided.
Although a number of investments were identified that in
turn have subsidiaries, only the initial investment was included
in the analysis. One reason for this was the lack of data that
would enable all of the subsidiary investments to be tracked,
while a second reason was that the minority stake in many of
the investments limited the ability of the Baby Bells to
influence management. However, determining how Cingular
Wireless should be treated in the analysis is not
straightforward. As a joint venture between two Baby Bells,
Cingular could conceivably be included in the totals for both
BellSouth and SBC. However, an argument can be made that
since SBC is the majority shareholder Cingular should be
included solely within its total. Ultimately, including Cingular
within the totals for both Baby Bells would inflate the number
of investments, and distort the subsequent analysis. Therefore,
when this and SBC’s merger with BellSouth were taken into
account, Cingular and its various subsidiaries were included
only within SBC’s total.
B. INTERNATIONALIZATION AND DE-INTERNATIONALIZATION
1. Total Number of International Investments
Figure 2 enables a series of observations to be made
regarding the internationalization and de-internationalization
of the Baby Bells. In the first place, the Baby Bells have
collectively made 198 international investments between
January 1984 and August 2006. There is considerable variation
in the number of investments made each year; in some years
only a handful of investments were made while in 1991 almost
thirty investments were made. Hence, the “golden age” of
54. Peter Curwen, A Brief Illustrated Discourse on the Concept of “Large”
in the Context of Mobile Telephony, 7 INFO 76 (2005).
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internationalization would appear to have been between 1991
and 1995. During these five years, ninety-three international
investments were made with the result that the number of
investments held peaked between 1996 and 1997.
A second observation is that from 1991 onwards the
number of international acquisitions that the Baby Bells made
gradually declined with the exception of two years, 1995 and
2004. The first exceptional year, 1995, falls within the “golden
age” noted above while the second does not. The increase in
2004 was due to the acquisition by Cingular Wireless of AT&T
Wireless that brought with it a large international portfolio
located primarily in the Caribbean. Despite this seemingly
significant international acquisition, relatively few subscribers
were located outside of the United States. 55 Furthermore, in
the year after acquiring AT&T Wireless, Cingular sold all of its
international operations except one, partly to satisfy regulatory
requirements arising from the acquisition and partly to exit
markets in which it was no longer interested.

FIGURE 2: NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS, JANUARY
1984 – AUGUST 2006
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55. Although AT&T Wireless had 23,952 million proportionate (equity)
subscribers at the end of December 2004, 22.1 million of these were located in
the United States. The Caribbean accounted for just over 300,000
proportionate subscribers between them, while India accounted for 1.545
million.
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A final observation is that from 2000 onwards the Baby
Bells sold more international investments than they acquired.
In other words, their de-internationalization began in earnest
during 2000. This is, however, slightly misleading as it ignores
the de-internationalization associated with the divestments of
AirTouch Communications by Pacific Telesis and of MediaOne
by US West. Both of these divestments, in 1994 and 1998
respectively, reduced the overall number of international
investments, though given the larger international portfolio of
MediaOne its divestment was the more significant of the two.
By September 2006, as a consequence of divestments and sales,
the Baby Bells held just seven international investments
between them.
2. NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL
BABY BELLS
Figure 2 does not show the variation that exists between
the Baby Bells in terms of the number of international
investments that they made. From Figure 3 (below) it can be
seen that the maximum number of international investments
held by the Baby Bells ranged from seven by Ameritech to
thirty-six by Verizon (Bell Atlantic on the Chart). However, the
abrupt ending of lines for four Baby Bells signifies either the
complete divestment of their international operations (Pacific
Telesis and US West) or the year in which they merged with
another Baby Bell with the consequence that their international
investments were transferred to the new company (Ameritech
and Nynex). When this is taken into account, the thirty-six
investments held by Verizon are in fact the result of Bell
Atlantic’s mergers with Nynex and GTE. Thus, the largest
number of international investments held by a single Baby Bell
was thirty-four by US West in 1996.
FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF INVESTMENTS BY BABY BELL, 1984 –
AUGUST 2006
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Verizon Communications continued its international
expansion until 2001 when it affected an abrupt volte-face.
Beginning in 2002, Verizon sold, in all, thirty-three
international investments so that by August 2006 just two were
left. 56 The two that remain are a half share in Gibraltar-Nynex
Communications and a 23.1% stake in Vodafone Italy.
SBC also increased its international footprint through its
merger with Ameritech in 1998. The merger added seven new
holdings, although its impact was partially offset by the sale of
international investments within its existing portfolio as well as
among the newly acquired operations. From 1998 onwards, SBC
steadily offloaded its international investments, although its
portfolio dramatically increased once more in 2004 with
Cingular’s acquisition of AT&T Wireless. However, this upturn
was only temporary: Cingular sold two of the newly acquired
investments in 2004, twelve in 2005 and has retained just the
one in the United States Virgin Islands. It also continued to sell
its original portfolio of holdings.
Figure 3 also shows that in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
BellSouth was at the forefront of Baby Bell internationalization.
BellSouth rapidly built the largest international portfolio. This
resulted in a shift in its strategic priorities away from Australia
- where it owned various paging businesses as well as a stake in
Optus, the second national operator – and towards cellular
markets. This resulted in a small decrease before it remained
more or less steady until the turn of the millennium.
Another strategic change, this time in favor of Latin
American cellular markets, resulted in a further withdrawal,
primarily from Europe, as did BellSouth’s exit from Brazil due
to tougher-than-anticipated market conditions there. Although
BellSouth had previously claimed that Latin America was a
strategic priority along with broadband, long-distance and
domestic wireless, it sold its Brazilian investments in March
2004 to Telefónica Móviles for $5.85 billion. 57
3. Line of Business Entered by Baby Bell
It is also possible to identify the different lines of business
56. Although Verizon announced the sale of its operations in the
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Venezuela in April 2006, these were
subject to regulatory approval that is in the process of being granted.
57. See BELLSOUTH, CONNECTING TO WHAT’S IMPORTANT: (2001) ANNUAL
REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS (2002).
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that the Baby Bells invested in overseas. Eight lines of business
are identified in Table 3. The first point that can be made is
that one line of business, cellular, accounts for 40% of all the
investments made by the Baby Bells, a figure that vastly
exceeds cable, the second most popular line of business. Taken
together, these two lines of business account for almost 60% of
all the investments made. It is worth noting that although
twenty-nine “fixed” and twenty-five “services” investments were
made, these two categories are quite broad. Consequently, in
the services category, directory publishing and information
services are the two main sub-categories, while in the fixed
category, investment in public telephone operators is the largest
sub-category. Even if these sub-categories were separated out,
the largest, public telephone operators would, at best,
numerically have the same number of investments as paging
and thus account numerically for only a small area of
investment for the Baby Bells.

Line of business

TABLE 3: BABY BELL INVESTMENT BY LINE OF BUSINESS 58
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198

Secondly, the investment portfolios of four Baby Bells are
bipolar. Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Pacific Telesis and US West
all have two lines of business that have received more or less
the same number of international investments. For Ameritech,
Bell Atlantic and Pacific Telesis the two lines of business are
cellular and fixed whereas for US West is it cable and cellular.
58. AT&T INC., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT (2006). BELLSOUTH FOUND.,
CONNECTING TO WHAT’S IMPORTANT: (2001) ANNUAL REPORT TO
SHAREHOLDERS (2002), BELLSOUTH FOUND., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT (2004),
BELLSOUTH CORP., 2005 ANNUAL REPORT: THIS IS NOT A PHONE LINE… (2006).
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US West stands out as the only Baby Bell to invest extensively
in cable businesses overseas, accounting for almost two-thirds of
all Baby Bell investments in that market. In contrast,
BellSouth has overwhelmingly favored cellular, as has SBC.
Although the difference between cellular and the other lines of
business for Nynex is not as great, it does account for almost
half of all the international investments that it made.
Broadly speaking, three-quarters of all the international
investments took place during the 1990s which, when
widespread liberalization and the introduction of competition
are taken into account, is perhaps not surprising. What could be
viewed as a surprise, however, is that the lines of business in
which the Baby Bells have invested has changed over time. In
the 1980s, three lines of business were preferred: equipment,
paging and services. All eight equipment international
investments were made by Bell Atlantic and SBC during the
1980s, while most paging and service investments also occurred
during this decade. Both BellSouth and Pacific Telesis invested
in paging businesses on a more or less equal basis, whereas
several Baby Bells made service investments throughout the
decade. During the 1990s, in contrast, investments took place
in different lines of business. Investments in cable, which began
at the end of the 1980s, continue throughout the decade to be
joined by two other lines of business, cellular and fixed. Cellular
investments accounted for 45% of all investments throughout
the decade, and regularly constituted the single largest area of
investment numerically in each year.
4. International Expansion Through Merger Activity
Both Bell Atlantic and SBC have engaged in domestic
mergers with companies that already had an established
international presence of their own, resulting in often quite
substantial changes to their international footprints in the
process. Prior to its 1996 merger with Nynex, the
internationalization of Bell Atlantic could readily be described
as largely disappointing, albeit with two exceptions, TCNZ and
Omnitel in Italy. While Bell Atlantic steadily expanded its
international footprint, it was not until 1990 that it made its
first significant investment overseas when it joined with
Ameritech to acquire TCNZ for $2.5 billion. 59 This was then
followed three years later by an investment in Grupo Iusacell, a

59. BELL ATLANTIC, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (1992).
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Mexican wireless operator, and by investment in Omnitel, an
Italian wireless operator, in 1994. 60
TCNZ, Grupo Iusacell, and Omnitel are financially the
three largest international investments made by Bell Atlantic.
While TCNZ and Omnitel can be considered very successful
international investments, the same cannot be said for Bell
Atlantic’s investment in Grupo Iusacell. In November 1993, Bell
Atlantic invested $520 million to acquire a 23% stake in the
Mexican wireless operator, and invested a further $524 million
the following June to increase its stake to 41.9%. Although Bell
Atlantic was initially very enthusiastic about this investment,
problems were soon encountered and it was dragged into a
corruption scandal involving the founding Peralta family.
Subsequently, Bell Atlantic invested once more in Grupo
Iusacell with the consequence that its total investment in the
company increased to $1.7 billion. Unsatisfactory growth by the
company, as well as continued unfavorable economic conditions,
eventually forced Bell Atlantic/Nynex to write-off $957 million
of its investment before selling its stake in the company in
2003. 61
Bell Atlantic suffered other disappointments when
internationalizing prior to its merger with Nynex. The Baby
Bell participated in consortia in Australia, South Korea, and
Taiwan, with those in Australia and Taiwan failing to win a
cellular license while the alliance with Korea Telecom came to
With the sale of the European equipment
nothing. 62
businesses, the international footprint lacked geographical
coherence and was generally regarded as “piecemeal”. 63
The merger of Bell Atlantic and Nynex helped to rectify this
as the international footprint of Nynex complemented that of
Bell Atlantic. The merger extended its international footprint
into six new countries and complemented its existing presence
in both Europe and Asia. For example, Nynex but not Bell
Atlantic was present in Greece, and although both Baby Bells
were present in the Czech and Slovak Republics, they operated
60. BELL ATLANTIC, INVESTOR’S REFERENCE GUIDE 95 78ff (1996).
61. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC., DELIVERING THE NEW WORLD OF
COMMUNICATIONS: 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2004).
62. C.D. WASDEN, NAT’L REGULATORY RESEARCH INST., A DESCRIPTIVE
COMPENDIUM OF THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR U.S. BASED
UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES 93-10 (1993).
63. Looking for the Turnpike, GLOBAL TELECOMM. BUS. (1994).
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in different lines of business—directory publishing in the case of
Nynex and cellular for Bell Atlantic.
The merger of Bell Atlantic/Nynex with GTE further
expanded its international footprint. Perhaps surprisingly, the
ten international investments of GTE were all located in
countries in which neither Bell Atlantic nor Nynex were
present, and included countries that Bell Atlantic had
previously sought unsuccessfully to enter such as Taiwan. The
two European investments, in Austria and Hungary,
complemented the existing Bell Atlantic/Nynex investments as
they were both geographically near and in a line of business in
which the Baby Bell was already active, namely, directory
publishing.
GTE also operated five fixed-wire investments in what can
best be described as an eclectic range of countries. Two of these
investments were located in the Pacific and one each in Canada,
the Caribbean, and Latin America. The scattered nature of
these investments broadened the resulting international
footprint as much as the complementary European operations
gave it coherence. Although additional international
investments were made after the merger with GTE, these did
not fill in the gaps, the most substantial of which was in
Canada where the Baby Bell already had a presence. Given the
limited nature of these additional investments, the merger
between Bell Atlantic/Nynex and GTE could be viewed as
marking
the
highpoint
of
the
Bell
Atlantic’s
internationalization.
SBC has also entered into mergers that have impacted its
international presence. The internationalization of SBC can be
divided into two periods on either side of 1995. Prior to 1995,
SBC invested in four different lines of business, cellular,
equipment, fixed-wire, and services. The businesses are located
in a geographically diffuse set of countries including Australia,
France, Israel, Mexico, and the UK. Notwithstanding this
apparent lack of focus, Maney 64 described the international
holdings as “brilliant” though it can be argued that this was
primarily due to the investment in Telmex, the success of which
has been described above.
After 1995, SBC focused most of its internationalization
efforts on two lines of business, namely cellular and fixed-wire,
64. KEVIN MANEY, MEGAMEDIA SHAKEOUT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE
LEADERS AND THE LOSERS IN THE EXPLODING COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
(1995).
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although it did continue to invest across a broad range of
countries. Although most of these investments were focused on
the cellular market, in 1997 SBC acquired three stakes in fixedwire operators, Golden Lines International (Israel), diAx
(Switzerland) and Telekom South Africa (Republic of South
Africa). 65 The merger with Ameritech in the following year
added four more fixed-wire investments, but as the remaining
stake in TCNZ was sold in 1998, the net addition to SBC’s fixedwire portfolio was three. 66 As all three investments were in
Europe, the merger expanded SBC’s European footprint.
Even though SBC made two more investments in fixed-wire
operators, these were in contrast to the sale of fixed-wire
investments that began in 1999 but mainly constituted sales
during 2003 and 2004. As the sale of investments was not
restricted to fixed-wire, 1998 effectively marked the high point
of internationalization by SBC. The acquisition of AT&T
Wireless by Cingular Wireless did expand its international
footprint, albeit only temporarily as most operations were sold
during 2004.
III. WHY THE BABY BELLS DE-INTERNATIONALIZED?
The previous section has charted the internationalization
and de-internationalization of the Baby Bells. By 1995, however
the “golden age” of Baby Bell internationalization had come to
an end. From the mid-1990s onward, the Baby Bells exited
international markets to such an extent that by 2006 they
collectively retained just seven international investments. Thus,
the answer to the question “Whatever happened to the Baby
Bells?” is quite simply, that the Baby Bells returned to their
home market of the United States.
However, while this answer is an accurate description of
what happened, it does not explain why the Baby Bells sold or
divested almost all of their international investments. The deinternationalization of the Baby Bells can be explained through
three inter-related issues, namely: the financial returns from
internationalization, the changing nature of regulation within
the United States, and domestic merger and acquisition
activity.
65. SBC COMM. INC., 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1998); WHALLEY, supra
note 27.
66. See AMERITECH, ANNUAL REPORT 1998 28F (1999).
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Although some of the international investments made by
the Baby Bells proved to be very successful financially, there is
little evidence to suggest that this was widespread. While the
Baby Bells draw attention in their annual reports to the
financial success of some of their investments, particularly their
cellular and public telephone operator investments, they are
largely silent as to the financial success of their international
investments in data, content, equipment, paging and services.
Even though the annual reports of the Baby Bells do not
provide sufficient detail to determine the financial success or
otherwise of individual investments, they do provide some
insight into the revenues and net income that the international
investments of some of the Baby Bells generated. 67 These
examples clearly demonstrate that whereas internationalization
may generate reasonable revenues and net income, Verizon and
BellSouth rely predominantly on their domestic businesses for
these. In other words, the financial contribution of their
internationalization, even at its peak, was not that substantial.
While the limited financial success of many of the
international investments undoubtedly contributed to the Baby
Bells’ de-internationalization, the remaining two issues are of
greater importance. As noted above, the MFJ imposed four lines
of business restrictions on the Baby Bells. The Baby Bells were
allowed to invest in other non-regulated services in 1987 and
information services in 1991, though they had to wait until the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 68 before they were released,
albeit subject to a fourteen-point competitive checklist in the
case of inter-exchange telecommunication services, from the
remaining two restrictions. The lifting of these restrictions
created new investment opportunities for the Baby Bells in the
United States, though it is arguably the case that the most
significant and attractive of these opportunities was entry into
the inter-exchange market.
The Baby Bells were initially unsuccessful in their
attempts at entering the inter-exchange market, not least
because regulators at both the state and federal level felt that
the local telephone markets served by the BOC were not
competitive. Bell Atlantic and SBC were, however, successful in
their attempts to expand their geographical footprint in the
United States through merging with their fellow Baby Bells.
67. VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 2001 ANNUAL REPORT (2002);
BELLSOUTH FOUND., 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (2004).
68. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26.
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Notwithstanding the increasingly onerous conditions placed on
the Baby Bell mergers by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), the mergers underlined the attractiveness
of the inter-exchange market to the Baby Bells. 69 The Baby
Bell mergers expanded both Bell Atlantic’s and SBC’s presence
in the local telephone market, markets that they could link
together once they were able to enter the inter-exchange
market.
It is worth noting that Pacific Telesis and US West reacted
differently to the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Pacific
Telesis pre-empted the Act by divesting AirTouch
Communications in 1994, thereby concentrating its attentions
on its core California and Nevadan markets. At the same time,
Pacific Telesis provided a wider range of services within these
two states, thereby leading Maney to describe the strategy as
However,
by
the
time
the
“California
First.” 70
Telecommunications Act was passed this strategy had not been
fully implemented, with the consequence that Pacific Telesis
was weakened to such an extent that it was taken over by SBC
for, in hindsight, a relatively modest sum.
US West also exited its non-BOC territory businesses,
albeit after the Telecommunications Act had become law. In
some respects, the decision of US West to divest its domestic
cable business was surprising; it had regularly drawn attention
to the UK where cable-television and telephony could be
combined, and had made several domestic purchases of cabletelevision systems culminating with the $10.8 billion purchase
of Continental Cablevision in early 1996. However, section 652
of the Telecommunications Act prohibited a telephone company
from owning more than 10% of a cable company providing
service in the same area. 71 Thus, while the FCC did approve
the merger, it required the cable systems of Continental
Cablevision within the region served by US West to be divested.
As a consequence, US West was unable to combine cable69. For a detailed discussion of FCC merger policy and the conditions
placed on the Baby Bells, see Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Footfalls:
Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the Digital Millennium (Univ.
Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 06-17, 2006).
70. MANEY, supra note 64, at 83f. In 1995 Pacific Telesis paid $696
million for PCS licenses covering California and Nevada and invested in
wireless cable-TV, as well. PACIFIC TELESIS, FACT BOOK (1995).
71. Telecommunications Act, supra note 26; see also Chen, supra note 69,
at 31.
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television services with telephony and achieved only limited
synergies. Both of these factors contributed to US West’s
decision to divest MediaOne in 1998.
As the attention of the Baby Bells turned towards their
domestic markets, the Baby Bells began to de-internationalize.
If the passing of the Telecommunications Act in 1996 and the
granting of the first Baby Bell entry into the inter-exchange
telecommunication services market in 1999 are superimposed
on Figures 2 and 3 above, we can see that the latter coincides
with the beginning of their de-internationalization. As the Baby
Bells exited international markets, they re-deployed the freed
capital within their domestic markets, partly to acquire other
companies and partly to improve their infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
This paper has charted the internationalization and deinternationalization of the Baby Bells. All of the Baby Bells
expanded
internationally,
making
198
international
investments spread across eight different lines of business.
However, both the number of investments made, and the lines
of business favored, differ between the seven Baby Bells. The
internationalization of the Baby Bells peaked in the mid-1990s,
with de-internationalization coming to the fore after 2000. The
Baby Bells have now sold all but seven of their international
investments.
The de-internationalization of the Baby Bells highlights the
continued importance of the home market. It is arguably the
case that while the restrictive regulatory environment imposed
by the MFJ encouraged the Baby Bells to internationalize,
changes in this environment also encouraged their deinternationalization. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
allowed the Baby Bells to enter the inter-exchange market,
while a liberal attitude to mergers/takeovers by the FCC
allowed them to expand geographically. The Baby Bells did,
albeit after a slight delay, enter the inter-exchange market and
they did merge with one another. The de-internationalization of
the Baby Bells contributed to the consolidation process by
allowing capital invested overseas to be re-deployed within the
United States. The end result was not only the effective
abandonment of international telecommunications markets by
the Baby Bells, but the creation of two vertically-integrated
operators with national wireless footprints, namely, AT&T and
Verizon Communications.

